A Social Trend: The Guilty Conscience

A Social Trend:

The Guilty Conscience

“The Guilty Conscience”. It is the New Religion; the Raison D’être; the new Modus Vivendi. North Americans now view this plight as a Natural Right, and as such, views guilt as a unifying force that brings closure, and clarity with all of guilty conscience’ principles of any good-hearted guilt ridden liberally compassionate conservative.

Now more than ever we need guidelines – or so I am told – that we have to live by. I find the trusty English Proverbs always provide a marsh-mellowy landing when times get rough. But, we have to be careful when it comes to safety nets because we could find ourselves right smack in the middle of a contradiction, and for most people, that is not where most of us want to be. Nevertheless, here are some guiltless guidelines coupled with their rejoinders:

He who hesitates is lost! BUT Look before you leap!

Birds of a feather flock together! BUT Opposites attract!

You're never too old to learn! BUT You can't teach an old dog new tricks!

Doubt is the beginning of wisdom! BUT Faith will move mountains!

The pen is mightier than the sword! BUT Actions speak louder than words!

Don't cross your bridges before you come to them! BUT Forewarned is forearmed!

Silence is golden! BUT The squeaky wheel gets the grease!

Clothes make the man! BUT Never judge a book by its cover!

Good things come in small packages! BUT The bigger the better!

A miss is as good as a mile! BUT Half a loaf is better than none!

Great starts make great finishes! BUT It ain't over 'till it's over!

Practice makes perfect! BUT All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy!

A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush! BUT a Man's reach should exceed his grasp!

Ignorance is bliss! BUT An unexamined life is not worth living!

Is it any wonder that drug and alcohol use is always on the rise? Aside from the fact that there is an ever increasing population entering the age of consent. Excess in moderation leading to moderation in moderation is a good thing because it keeps our gene pool in relatively safe boundaries, but we still remember things that we've done, acts that we've committed, and, yes, everything looks bad if you remember it.

A Guilty Conscience surveys as a whole, allows us to see where and why we are generally dissatisfied with predicaments as we objectively see them (note: not objectively because that’s too much work). The key point here is that something more than a force that generates vices and victories but we neglect to give them rein when need be, and then we gripe like a poet that has finally killed his inspiration when things don’t go our way.

Guilt is the oxygen, the greater currency that the West needs to keep going. Western comprehensive doctrine best serves the spiritual and material needs of people, but there is the actual need wherein we need a Douglas Adams Point-of-View to protect our self-serving and very (greedy?) personal interests, and utilize the time tested Zen Method of Navigation. A Guilty Conscience is a slender mistress with locks of gold and a see-through white silk and muslin robe that makes all want to worship Guilt. Pangs of self-reproach bring us aspects of governing morality – a human conscience. Acting purposefully is acting morally; is acting within a guilty conscience. To act within one's guilty conscience is nothing more than to listen to a nagging little voice that is supposedly a part of our spirit and self that tells us how to act. Three purposes that we can all agree on are dictated by this “voice of reason”; to act to 1) preserve one's body 2) develop one's mind and 3) expressing one's spirit that brings alignment with the dictates of one's guilty conscience. Whatever… I still have to say that everything still looks bad if youremember it. “Breakdowns only occur when my feelings are misunderstood” and this is when and where in our being left in confusion with all those silly and annoying conflicting impulses between body and mind, spirit, desire and action, and a good thing as opposed to something that could be potentially debilitating. Who gives a crap about your feelings, I have my own to contend with, and they are some tough mother-in-law ‘fuckers’. As with any voice being given the opportunity to share its opinion, it is time for me to allow the religious right to bear its argument and bring force and explanation as to why we do what we do.

Although guilt is commonly thought to be the emotion most linked with conscience, this is simply not so. Most events which elicit guilt are in fact amoral, but for entirely different reasons than might be suspected. They spring from amoral mental shifts which incorporate ideas into the mind which place mind above the body. This is when a learning experience, a right response is chosen.

Still keeping an eye on guilt as being brought about by peer pressure, itis a good place to start and end with one of today’s culturally exploited heated debates, referendums, or what-have-you arguments. That of same sex marriage. Notwithstanding that it is a fundamental breakdown in constitutional rights in a person’s ability to have dictated who, or what for that matter, to marry although I have no future intention of marrying any goats, I am simply addressing the issue of labels here. Rawlsian, Rortyism, Hobbesianism, and Kantianism states that we have a freedom of will that by right needs be left unimpeded. In our deliberative liberally constitutionally dictated society, we all have certain basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, and one of these is the right to be happy as an end in itself – although being happy in this culture goes against every grainof the democracy in which we presently reside. For years now I have debated with my girlfriend whether Brazilian waxing is better than shaving. But, it has been impressed upon me that the Christian Right whom has been claiming same-sex marriage would destroy our very fabric of being is a severely more important issue.“The gospel of Jesus Christ will be severely curtailed” as recorded in the four gospels that state absolutely nothing about same-sex marriage, or GAYuality for that matter. Nevertheless, poignant “variations” of the Christian Right are fond of using the internet and here are the very strong arguments in favor of the Christian Doctrine, unfortunately their author is not known. I discovered them at 411mania.com some time ago, but the link no longer seems active.

1. Being gay is not natural. And as you know North Americans have always rejected unnatural things like eyeglasses, polyester, and air conditioning.

2. Gay marriage will encourage people to be gay, in the same way that hanging around tall people will make you tall.

3. Legalizing gay marriage will open the door to all kinds of crazy behaviour. People may even wish to marry their pets because, as you know, a dog has legal standing and can sign a marriage contract.

4. Straight marriage has been around a long time and hasn’t changed at all; women are still property, blacks still can't marry whites, and divorce is still illegal.

5. Straight marriage will be less meaningful if gay marriage were allowed.

The sanctity of Brittany Spears’  55-hour just-for-fun marriage would be destroyed.

6. Straight marriages are valid because they produce children. Gay couples, infertile couples, and old people shouldn’t be allowed to marry because our orphanages aren’t full yet, and the world needs more children.

7. Obviously gay parents will raise gay children, since straight parents only raise straight children.

8. Gay marriage is not supported by religion. In a theocracy like ours, the values of one religion are imposed on the entire country. That’s why we have only one religion in North America.

9. Children can never succeed without a male and a female role model at home. That’s why we as a society expressly forbid single parents to raise children.

10. Gay marriage will change the foundation of society; we could never adapt to new social norms. Just like we haven’t adapted to cars, the service-sector economy, or longer life spans.

WHAT THE FUCK!!! “A good laugh is good medicine" is a good viewpoint, and seems to be in appropriate here, but it is a Christian point of view that appears to poke fun at evolution, and the natural laws as well as a fairness and justice that escapes even the most sensible Mormon, mind you that most people of sense don’t readily have at hand a hat full of golden plates and seer stones that translate God’s words. We laughed at the Queen in Lewis Carroll’s “Alice in Wonderland”, wherein she“ sometimes believed in six impossible things before breakfast”. So now I am forced to laugh at all my Cosmological buddies and all my Darwinian professors who try to teach me these really outrageous and quite impossible fairy tales to me. From the comma splice in the first sentence to the misplaced period in the second, religion is filled with grammatical faux pas, not to mention factual ones, and downright silly claims such as, and I do not remember who coined this phrase, “Darwinists know they have to hide their atheist religion”. I used some edition of Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary:

Atheism: a disbelief in the existence of deity. Religion: the service and worship of God.

“Atheist religion” is an oxymoron.

The too frequently used threat that "God will punish you for...whatever", is mass control at it's worst, reflecting moral arrogance by those who claim to know what God wants, but spend too much time talking to God and too little time listening to the nagging little voice within. I need my little voice, it listens. But in reality, any directive that elicits a guilty conscience remains in the realm of control and has solely to do with politically correct cultural trappings which are Pavlovian learned responses. My mind should no more be elevated above body than my body should be elevated above my mind. Both must work in concert in order to serve me. It is a Cartesian dualism that I feel perfectly at ease with and my nagging little voice is telling me that the instillation and manipulation of my guilty conscience is a heinous, power-stealing practice, which misses the message of any emotion that I might be capable of perceiving…in part or in whole.

I find that a guilty conscience puts me in a “Lingerie State of Mind”.

Nietzsche: Master & Slave Morality

Nietzsche: Master & Slave Morality

Master morality

Nietzsche defined master morality as the morality of the
strong-willed. What is good is what is helpful; what is bad is what
is harmful. Morality as such is sentiment. In the prehistoric state,
"the value or non-value of an action was derived from its
consequences" but ultimately, "There are no moral phenomena at
all, only moral interpretations of phenomena." For these strongwilled
men, the 'good' is the noble, strong and powerful, while the
'bad' is the weak, cowardly, timid and petty. The essence of master
morality is nobility. Morality is designed to protect that which the
strong-willed man values, and for slave and master, "Fear is the
mother of morality." Other qualities that are often valued in master
moralities are open-mindedness, courage, truthfulness, trust and
an accurate sense of self-worth. Master morality begins in the
'noble man' with a spontaneous idea of the good, then the idea of
bad develops as what is not good. "The noble type of man
experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval;
it judges, 'what is harmful to me is harmful in itself'; it knows itself
to be that which first accords honour to things; it is value
creating." Ultimately, "There are no moral phenomena at all, only
moral interpretations of phenomena." In this sense, the master
morality is the full recognition that oneself is the measure of all
things. Insomuch as something is helpful to the strong-willed man
it is like what he values in himself; therefore, the strong-willed man
values such things as 'good'. Masters are creators of morality;
slaves responds to master-morality with their slave-morality.

Slave morality

Unlike master morality which is sentiment, slave morality is
literally re-sentiment (resentment) – revaluing that which the
master values. This strays from the valuation of actions based on
consequences to the valuation of actions based on "intention". As
master morality originates in the strong, slave morality originates
in the weak. Slave morality is a reaction to oppression, it creates
villains of its oppressors. Slave morality is the inverse of master
morality. As such, it is characterized by pessimism and skepticism.
Slave morality is created in opposition to what master morality
values as 'good'. Slave morality does not aim at exerting one's will
by strength but by careful subversion. It does not seek to transcend
the masters, but to make them slaves as well. The essence of slave
morality is utility: the good is what is most useful for the whole
community, not the strong. Nietzsche saw this as a contradiction,
“and [sic] how could there exist a common good”. The expression is
a self-contradiction: what can be common has ever been but little
value. In the end it must be as it has always been: great things are
for the great, abysses for the profound, shudders and delicacies, for
the refined, and, in sum, all rare things for the rare." Since the
powerful are few in number compared to the masses of the weak,
the weak gain power by corrupting the strong into believing that
the causes of slavery (viz., the will to power) are 'evil', and the
qualities they originally could not choose because of their
weakness. By saying humility is voluntary, slave morality avoids
admitting that their humility was in the beginning force upon them
by a master. Biblical principles of turning the other cheek,
humility, charity, and pity are the result of universalizing the plight
of the slave onto all mankind, and thus enslaving the masters as
well. "The democratic movement inherits the Christian." The
political manifestation of slave morality because of its obsession
with freedom and equality.
Master-slave morality is a central theme of Friedrich
Nietzsche's works, in particular the first essay of On the Genealogy
of Morality. Nietzsche argued that there were two fundamental types of morality: 'Master Morality' and 'Slave Morality'.
Master Morality weighs actions on a scale of good or bad consequences
unlike slave morality which weighs actions on a scale of good or evil
intentions. What Nietzsche meant by 'morality' deviates from
common understanding of this term. For Nietzsche, a particular
morality is the inseparable from the formation of a particular
culture. This means that its language, codes and practises,
narratives, and institutions are informed by the struggle between
these two types of moral valuation. For Nietzsche, master-slave
morality provides the basis of all exegesis of Western thought. With
the Death of God morality became historical: it was created by
mankind, not by a transcendent deity. The strong-willed man
created morality by valuation.
It is then these two character-types–the master and the slave–
that we find in the world, amidst the contest of wills, the struggle of
forces, the exercise of power. The two personality-types cannot be
anymore different. In contrast to the master, who “cannot separate
action from happiness,” happiness for the slave is “obsessed with
poisonous, malevolent feelings.” Correlatively, “when the powerful
person hates, he may discharge his hatred through direct action,
and get it out of his system. The weak, however, cannot do this.
They must contain their hatred, which acts as a psychological
toxin, poisoning the spirit.” This leads the slave to resentment.
Despite (and reinforced by) forming his system of morality,
the slave (still) feels resentment: “he resents the master’s strength
as well as his own relative impotency.” According to Nietzsche’s
estimation, the slave must recognize that he is bad, “yet he is not
able to accept the idea that he is to be treated any differently from
anyone else, however high or low; or that he is to be treated as a
means to the master’s purposes or pleasures. As a human being,
he feels that he has been treated with insufficient dignity, or with
none.” The slave thus (subtly, secretively, after bottling up the
hatred deep inside)–using religion, their most common tool–takes
revenge on the master. Nietzsche claims that this has historically
consisted “in getting the master to accept the value table of the
slave himself, and to evaluate himself from the slave’s perspective”
(hence the world’s dominant religions). Thus, the slaves manage to
transform the master into the ascetic.
Existentialism is a philosophical movement which posits that
individual human beings create the meaning and essence of their
lives. It emerged as a movement in twentieth-century literature and
philosophy, though it had forerunners in earlier centuries.
Existentialism generally postulates that the absence of a
transcendent force (such as God) means that the individual is
entirely free, and, therefore, ultimately responsible. (Nevertheless,
Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky were Christians.) It is up to humans to
create an ethos of personal responsibility outside of any branded
belief system. That personal articulation of being is the only way to
rise above humanity's absurd condition (suffering and death, and
the finality of the individual).
Existentialism is a reaction against traditional philosophies,
such as rationalism and empiricism, seeking to discover an
ultimate order in metaphysical principles or in the structure of the
observed world, and therefore universal meaning. As a
philosophical movement, existentialism's origins are heavily
accredited to the nineteenth-century philosophers Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, and existentialism was prevalent in Continental
philosophy. Literary writers such as Dostoevsky also contributed to
the movement.
In the 1940s and 1950s, French existentialists such as Jean-
Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Simone de Beauvoir, wrote
scholarly and fictional works that popularized existential themes
such as "dread, boredom, alienation, the absurd, freedom,
commitment, and nothingness". Walter Kaufmann described
Existentialism as, "The refusal to belong to any school of thought,
the repudiation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever,
and especially of systems, and a marked dissatisfaction with
traditional philosophy as superficial, academic, and remote from
life."
Nietzsche's works were published too early to be considered a
part of the 20th century existentialist movement. They were
philosophers whose works and influences are not limited to
existentialism. They have been appropriated and seen as
precursors to many other intellectual movements, including
postmodernism, nihilism, and various strands of psychology. Thus,
it is unknown whether they would have supported the
existentialism of the 20th century or accepted tenets of Jean-Paul
Sartre's version of it. Nevertheless, their works are precursors to
many later developments in existentialist thought. Nietzsche wrote
that human nature and human identity vary depending on what
values and beliefs humans hold. It is a fundamental existential
belief that human beings are alone in the world. This aloneness
leads to feelings of meaninglessness which can be overcome only by
creating one's own values and meanings. We have the power to
create because we have the freedom to choose. In making our own
choices we assume full responsibility for the results and blame no
one but ourselves if the result is less than what was desired. The
psychotherapist helps his or her patients/clients along this path: to
discover why the patient/client is overburdened by the anxieties of
aloneness and meaninglessness, to find new and better ways to
manage these anxieties, to make new and healthy choices, and to
emerge from therapy as a free and sound human being.
Nietzsche's aesthetic usage of the concepts, which was later
developed philosophically, began with his book The Birth of
Tragedy. In this work, he stated that a fusion of Dionysian and
Apollonian "Kunsttriebe" (artistic impulses) is dramatic art's
(tragedy's) main prerequisite and that this has essentially not been
achieved since ancient Greek tragedy. Nietzsche emphasizes that
the works of Aeschylus, above all, and also Sophocles represent the
summit of artistic creation, the true realization of tragedy; it is with
Euripides, he states, that tragedy begins its "Untergang" (literally
"going under," meaning decline, deterioration, downfall, death).
Nietzsche objects to Euripides' utilization of Socratic rationalism in
his tragedies, claiming that the infusion of ethics and reason in
tragedy robs it of its foundation, namely the fragile balance of the
Dionysian and Apollonian.
Apollonian: the dream state, principium individuationis
(principle of individuation), plastic (visual) arts, beauty, clarity,
stint to formed boundaries, individuality, celebration of
appearance/illusion, human beings as artists (or media of art's
manifestation), self-control, perfection, exhaustion of possibilities,
creation.
Dionysian: intoxication, celebration of nature, instinctual,
intuitive, pertaining to the sensation of pleasure or pain,
individuality dissolved and hence destroyed, wholeness of
existence, orgiastic passion, dissolution of all boundaries, excess,
human being(s) as the work and glorification of art, destruction.
This struggle between master and slave moralities recurs
historically. According to Nietzsche, ancient Greek and Roman
societies were grounded in master morality. The Homeric hero is
the strong-willed man, and the classical roots of the Iliad and
Odyssey exemplified Nietzsche's master morality. He calls the
heroes "men of a noble culture", giving a substantive example of
master morality. Historically, master morality was defeated as the
slave morality of Christianity spread throughout the Roman
Empire.
According to Nietzsche, the essential struggle between
cultures has always been between the Roman (master, strong) and
the Judean (slave, weak). He condemns the triumph of slave
morality in the West, saying that the democratic movement is the
"collective degeneration of man". Nietzsche claimed that the
nascent democratic movement of his time was essentially Jewish,
slavish, and weak. Weakness conquered strength, slave conquered
master, re-sentiment conquered sentiment. This resentment
Nietzsche calls "priestly vindictiveness", which is the jealousy of the
weak seeking to enslave the strong with itself. Such movements
were, to Nietzsche, inspired by "the most intelligent revenge" of the
weak. Nietzsche saw democracy and Christianity as the same
emasculating impulse which sought to make all equal--to make all
slaves.

THE IRONIC 'ALONENESS' OF SOCIAL MEDIA

THE IRONIC 'ALONENESS' OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Let's face it, we all love Social Media. The ability to "Reach Out" and not touch someone is more pervasive than ever, and actually reaching out and touching seems fraught with more and more complications. Every time we leave the computer. There is nothing simpler than having an entirely vague, anonymous & platonic relationship with someone on Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, Reddit, Pinterest, or the tens of thousands of our favourite forums seems to be an acceptable station in life. When your friends ask you, “Whatchya do last night?’. Replying, “I spent a couple hours on Twitter and Facebook, had some coffee and went to bed with my cat.”, seems perfectly acceptable. Forget the fact that you were asked to go to the club or bar with some “buddies” from work, or the gym, or your Brother, but you had a fun time… DIDN’T YOU??? These online entities you call ‘friends’ or you ‘follow’ share the same ideas , morals, time constraints, don’t they? Philosophies? Hobbies? It's not like going for a coffee or sharing a ride home from work... you can't logoff when you've that deep of a commitment. Social Media comes with no "Baggage", and it really does seem that it comes with little or no Caveats.

Social media has certainly redefined and expanded the absolute number of human social interactions. A qualitative look at how we use these media to interact with others, however, sheds light on an ironic fallout from its use: social media can actually enhance physical isolation, loneliness and detachment from others.

Socially Prolific, but Physically Isolated. While our personal social interaction with others has increased, we spend more and more time being physically isolated. We share our lives through a media that we can’t fully comprehend; with people that actually makes solitary experience seem bearable and completely enjoyable, because it has the approval of everyone you know.

As traditional physical interaction is decreased, did you know or were you aware that you are being increasingly replaced by virtual ‘Friend-World’? This decline in physical connectivity has an amazing impact in how we comport ourselves with others. What would have hospitalized you a decade ago as asymptomatic of an impending sociopathic or psychopathic collapse, is actually being accepted as normal behaviour. Allow me to ask you this; ‘When was the last time that you walked the sidewalk, and somebody actually smiled at you in passing?’ Think of these two possibilities… 1) They weren’t looking at you because they were talking into their cell-phones or texting or playing an app... OR 2) They didn’t have one out. I’m not excluding looking down at their iPods, iPads, or iPhones. Any device will do… MP3 players, Beautiful Watches… anything. It seems that our ‘technological defenses’ are cross-overs, or comfortable accessories to our “Socially Prolific, but Physically Isolated World” that we have, in all likelihood, allowed into our lives, even if it was an unrecognized stranger, or the “way you were brought up”. You’ve allowed it never the less.

MORE TO COME…

Just War

Just War

Principles of the Just War

Ø  A just war can only be waged as a last resort. All non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force can be justified.

Ø  A war is just only if it is waged by a legitimate authority. Even just causes cannot be served by actions taken by individuals or groups who do not constitute an authority sanctioned by whatever the society and outsiders to the society deem legitimate.

Ø  A just war can only be fought to redress a wrong suffered. For example, self-defense against an armed attack is always considered to be a just cause (although the justice of the cause is not sufficient--see point #4). Further, a just war can only be fought with "right" intentions: the only permissible objective of a just war is to redress the injury.

Ø  A war can only be just if it is fought with a reasonable chance of success. Deaths and injury incurred in a hopeless cause are not morally justifiable.

Ø  The ultimate goal of a just war is to re-establish peace. More specifically, the peace established after the war must be preferable to the peace that would have prevailed if the war had not been fought.

Ø  The violence used in the war must be proportional to the injury suffered. States are prohibited from using force not necessary to attain the limited objective of addressing the injury suffered.

Ø  The weapons used in war must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. Civilians are never permissible targets of war, and every effort must be taken to avoid killing civilians. The deaths of civilians are justified only if they are unavoidable victims of a deliberate attack on a military target.

Historically, the just-war tradition—a set of mutually agreed rules of combat—commonly evolves between two similar enemies. When enemies differ greatly because of different religious beliefs, race, or language, war conventions have rarely been applied. It is only when the enemy is seen to be a people with whom one will do business in the following peace that tacit or explicit rules are formed for how wars should be fought and who they should involve. In part the motivation is seen to be mutually beneficial—it is preferable to remove any underhand tactics or weapons that may provoke an indefinite series of vengeance acts. Nonetheless, it has been the concern of the majority of just war theorists that such asymmetrical morality should be denounced, and that the rules of war should apply to all equally; that is, just war theory should be universal.

The just-war tradition is as old as warfare itself. Early records of collective fighting indicate that some moral considerations were used by warriors. They may have involved consideration of women and children or the treatment of prisoners. Commonly they invoked considerations of honour: some acts in war have always been deemed dishonourable, whilst others have been deemed honourable. Whilst the specifics of what is honourable differ with time and place, the very fact of one moral virtue has been sufficient to infuse warfare with moral concerns.

The just war theory also has a long history. Whilst parts of the Bible hint at ethical behavior in war and concepts of just cause, the most systematic exposition is given by Saint Thomas Aquinas. In the Summa Theologicae Aquinas presents the general outline of what becomes the just war theory. He discusses not only the justification of war, but also the kinds of activity that are permissible in war. Aquinas's thoughts become the model for later Scholastics and Jurists to expand. The most important of these are: Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1704), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), and Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767). In the twentieth century it has undergone a revival mainly in response to the invention of nuclear weaponry and American involvement in the Vietnam war. The most important contemporary texts include Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars (1977), Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill The Ethics of War (1979), Richard Norman Ethics, Killing, and War (1995), Brian Orend War and International Justice (2001) and Michael Walzer on War and Justice (2001), as well as seminal articles by Thomas Nagel "War and Massacre", Elizabeth Anscombe "War and Murder", and a host of others, commonly found in the journals Ethics or The Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs.

Since the terrorist attacks on the USA on 9/11 academics have turned their attention to just war once again with international and national conventions developing and consolidating the theoretical aspects of the conventions - just war theory has become a popular topic in International Relations, Political Science, Philosophy, Ethics, and Military History courses. Conference proceedings are regularly published, offering readers a breadth of issues that the topic stirs: e.g., Alexander Moseley and Richard Norman, eds. Human Rights and Military Intervention, Paul Robinson, ed., Just War in a Comparative Perspective, Alexsander Jokic, ed., War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing. What has been of great interest is that in the headline wars of the past decade, the dynamic interplay of the rules and conventions of warfare not only remain intact on the battlefield but their role and hence their explication have been awarded a higher level of scrutiny and debate. Generals have extolled their troops to adhere to the rules, soldiers are taught the just war conventions in the military academies, yet war crimes continue - genocidal campaigns have been waged by mutually hating peoples, leaders have waged total war on ethnic groups within or without their borders, and individual soldiers or guerilla bands have committed atrocious, murderous, or humiliating acts. Yet increasingly, the rule of law - the need to hold violators and transgressors responsible for their actions in war - is making headway onto the battlefield. In chivalrous times, the Christian crusader could seek absolution for atrocities committed in war; today, the law courts are less forgiving. Nonetheless, the idealism of those who seek the imposition of law and responsibility on the battlefield (cf. Geoffrey Robinson's Crimes Against Humanity (1999)), often runs ahead of the traditions and customs that demean or weaken the justum bellum that may exist between warring factions. And in some cases, no just war conventions exist at all. In such cases, the ethic of war is considered, or is implicitly held to be, beyond the norms of peaceful ethics and therefore deserving a separate moral realm where "fair is foul and foul is fair" (Shakespeare, Macbeth I.i). In such examples (e.g, Rwanda 1994), a people's justification of destructiveness and killing to whatever relative degree they hold to be justifiable in this amoral world, triumphs over attempts to establish the laws of peaceful interaction into this separate bloody realm, and in some wars, people fighting for their land or nation prefer to pick up the cudgel rather than the rapier, as Leo Tolstoy notes in War and Peace (Book 4.Ch.2), to sidestep the etiquette or war in favour securing their land from occupational or invading forces.

Against the just war (justum bellum) are those of a skeptical persuasion who do not believe that morality can or should exist in war. There are various positions against the need or the possibility of morality in war. Generally, consequentialists and act utilitarians may claim that if victory is sought then all methods should be employed to ensure it is gained at a minimum of expense and time. Arguments from 'military necessity' are of this type; for example, to defeat Germany in World War II, it was deemed necessary to bomb civilian centers, or in the US Civil War, for General Sherman to burn Atlanta. However, intrinsicists may also decree that no morality can exist in the state of war, for they may claim it can only exist in a peaceful situation in which recourse exists to conflict resolving institutions. Or intrinsicists may claim that possessing a just cause (the argument from righteousness) is a sufficient condition for pursuing whatever means are necessary to gain a victory or to punish an enemy. A different skeptical argument, one advanced by Michael Walzer, is that the invention of nuclear weapons alters war so much that our notions of morality—and hence just-war theories—become redundant. However, against Walzer, it can be reasonably argued that although such weapons change the nature of warfare they do not dissolve the need to consider their use within a moral framework.

Whilst sceptical positions may be derived from consequentialist and intrinsicist positions, they need not be. Consequentialists can argue that there are long-term benefits to having a war convention. For example, by fighting cleanly, both sides can be sure that the war does not escalate, thus reducing the probability of creating an incessant war of counter-revenges. Intrinsicists can argue that certain spheres of life ought never to be targeted in war; for example, hospitals and densely populated suburbs. The inherent problem with both ethical models is that they become either vague or restrictive when it comes to war. Consequentialism is an open-ended model, highly vulnerable to pressing military needs to adhere to any code of conduct in war: if more will be gained from breaking the rules than will be lost, the consequentialist cannot but demur to military necessity. On the other hand, intrinsicism can be so restrictive that it permits no flexibility in war; whether it entails a Kantian thesis of respecting others or a classical rights position, intrinsicism produces an inflexible model that would restrain warrior's actions to the targeting of permissible targets only. In principle such a prescription is commendable, yet the nature of war is not so clean cut when military targets can be hidden amongst civilian centers.

Against these two ethical positions, just war theory offers a series of principles that aim to retain a plausible moral framework for war. From the just war (justum bellum) tradition, theorists distinguish between the rules that govern the justice of war (jus ad bellum) from those that govern just and fair conduct in war (Jus In Bello). The two are by no means mutually exclusive, but they offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war that are neither unrestricted nor too restrictive. The problem for ethics involves expounding the guidelines in particular wars or situations.

The principles of the justice of war are commonly held to be: having just cause, being declared by a proper authority, possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, and the end being proportional to the means used. One can immediately detect that the principles are not wholly intrinsicist nor consequentialist—they invoke the concerns of both models. Whilst this provides just war theory with the advantage of flexibility, the lack of a strict ethical framework means that the principles themselves are open to broad interpretations. Examining each in turn draws attention to the relevant problems.

Possessing just cause is the first and arguably the most important condition of jus ad bellum. Most theorists hold that initiating acts of aggression is unjust and gives a group a just cause to defend itself. But unless 'aggression' is defined, this proscription is rather open-ended. For example, just cause resulting from an act of aggression can ostensibly be responses to a physical injury (e.g., a violation of territory), an insult (an aggression against national honor), a trade embargo (an aggression against economic activity), or even to a neighbor’s prosperity (a violation of social justice). The onus is then on the just war theorist to provide a consistent and sound account of what is meant by just cause. Whilst not going into the reasons of why the other explanations do not offer a useful condition of just cause, the consensus is that an initiation of physical force is wrong and may justly be resisted. Self-defense against physical aggression, therefore, is putatively the only sufficient reason for just cause. Nonetheless, the principle of self-defense can be extrapolated to anticipate probable acts of aggression, as well as in assisting others against an oppressive government or from another external threat (interventionism). Therefore, it is commonly held that aggressive war is only permissible if its purpose is to retaliate against a wrong already committed (e.g., to pursue and punish an aggressor), or to pre-empt an anticipated attack.

The notion of proper authority seems to be resolved for most of the theorists, who claim it obviously resides in the sovereign power of the state. But the concept of sovereignty raises a plethora of issues to consider here. If a government is just, i.e., it is accountable and does not rule arbitrarily, then giving the officers of the state the right to declare war is reasonable. However, the more removed from a proper and just form a government is, the more reasonable it is that its sovereignty disintegrates. A historical example can elucidate the problem: when Nazi Germany invaded France in 1940 it set up the Vichy puppet regime. What allegiance did the people of France under its rule owe to its precepts and rules? An Hobbesian rendition of almost absolute allegiance to the state entails that resistance is wrong; whereas a Lockean or instrumentalist conception of the state entails that a poorly accountable, inept, or corrupt regime possesses no sovereignty, and the right of declaring war (to defend themselves against the government or from a foreign power) is wholly justifiable. The notion of proper authority therefore requires thinking about what is meant by sovereignty, what is meant by the state, and what is the proper relationship between a people and its government.

The possession of right intention is ostensibly less problematic. The general thrust of the concept being that a nation waging a just war should be doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest or aggrandizement. Putatively, a just war cannot be considered to be just if reasons of national interest are paramount or overwhelm the pretext of fighting aggression. However, possessing right intention masks many philosophical problems. According to Kant, possessing good intent constitutes the only condition of moral activity, regardless of the consequences envisioned or caused, and regardless, or even in spite, of any self interest in the action the agent may have. The extreme intrinsicism of Kant can be criticized on various grounds, the most pertinent here being the value of self-interest itself. At what point does right intention separate itself from self-interest? On the one hand, if the only method to secure peace is to annex a belligerent neighbor's territory, political aggrandizement is intimately connected with the proper intention of maintaining the peace. On the other hand, a nation may possess just cause to defend an oppressed group, and may rightly argue that the proper intention is to secure their freedom, yet such a war may justly be deemed too expensive or too difficult to wage; i.e., it is not ultimately in their self-interest to fight the just war. On that account, some may demand that national interest is paramount: only if waging war on behalf of freedom is also complemented by the securing of economic or other military interests should a nation commit its troops. The issue of intention raises the concern of practicalities as well as consequences, both of which should be considered before declaring war.

The next principle is that of reasonable success. This is another necessary condition for waging just war, but again is insufficient by itself. Given just cause and right intention, the just war theory asserts that there must be a reasonable probability of success. The principle of reasonable success is consequentialist in that the costs and benefits of a campaign must be calculated. However, the concept of weighing benefits poses moral as well as practical problems as evinced in the following questions. Should one not go to the aid of a people or declare war if there is no conceivable chance of success? Is it right to comply with aggression because the costs of not complying are too prohibitive? Is it not sometimes morally necessary to stand up to a bullying larger force, as the Finns did when Russia invaded in 1940, for the sake of national self-esteem? Besides, posturing for defense may sometimes make aggression itself too costly, even for a much stronger side. However, the thrust of the principle of reasonable success emphasizes that human life and economic resources should not be wasted in what would obviously be an uneven match. For a nation threatened by invasion, other forms of retaliation or defense may be available, such as civil disobedience, or even forming alliances with other small nations to equalize the odds. Historically, many nations have overcome the probability of defeat: the fight may seem hopeless, but a charismatic leader or rousing speech can sometimes be enough to stir a people into fighting with all their will. Winston Churchill offered the British nation some of the finest of war's rhetoric when it was threatened with defeat and invasion by Nazi Germany in 1940. For example: "Let us therefore brace ourselves to do our duty, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Commonwealth and its Empire lasts for a thousand years, men will still say, 'This was their finest hour.’“ ….And “What is our aim?….Victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror; victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival." (Speeches to Parliament, 1940).

The final guide of jus ad bellum, is that the desired end should be proportional to the means used. This principle overlaps into the moral guidelines of how a war should be fought, namely the principles of Jus In Bello. With regards to just cause, a policy of war requires a goal, and that goal must be proportional to the other principles of just cause. Whilst this commonly entails the minimizing of war's destruction, it can also invoke general balance of power considerations. For example, if nation A invades a land belonging to the people of nation B, then B has just cause to take the land back. According to the principle of proportionality, B’s counter-attack must not invoke a disproportionate response: it should aim to retrieve its land. That goal may be tempered with attaining assurances that no further invasion will take place. But for B to invade and annex regions of A is nominally a disproportionate response, unless (controversially) that is the only method for securing guarantees of no future reprisals. For B to invade and annex A and then to continue to invade neutral neighboring nations on the grounds that their territory would provide a useful defense against other threats is even more unsustainable.

On the whole the principles offered by jus ad bellum are useful guidelines. Philosophically however they invoke a plethora of problems by either their independent vagueness or by mutually inconsistent results. They are nonetheless a useful starting point for ethics and remain a pressing concern for statesmen and women.